Mechanisms of the Hamas Resistance Against Israel
Mohamed Omar
Hamas adopted new mechanisms in the confrontation against Israel, shifting from being on the defensive to full blown offense. Hamas has conducted multiple, simultaneous attacks to maximize human and material losses, and has planned counterattacks to Israel’s response. The resistance has also adopted new military techniques, open warfare, abandoned the logic of limited strikes, and increased its intelligence capabilities. This has set Palestine on the path of escalation with repercussions for the entire Middle East.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas’ Tufan al-Aqsa operation, which was later joined by other Palestinian movements, signified a strategic shift toward attack-based resistance, taking on new military, intelligence, and security dimensions, and establishing a new political framework at the regional and international levels. Although Hamas will not be able to achieve more than it did in the first wave of the attack, it still made significant military and political gains, that could lead Israel to make temporary concessions under the pressures of security failure and the regional backlash in public opinion against Israel’s policy of collective punishment against the Palestinians.
Different mechanisms
Palestinian resistance movements followed several different mechanisms in the battle of “Tufan Al Aqsa” against Israel. The following represent significant differences from previous operations and attacks:
Shift in response from defense to attack: Hamas modified its military doctrine towards confrontation with Israel. Previously, Hamas based its armed confrontations primarily on “response and defense” rather than on initiating attacks. Tufan Al-Aqsa therefore represents a strategic shift towards a policy of pre-emptive strikes and attacks, even if there are no plans to withdraw or counter the Israeli response, which Hamas has taken into account in previous operations.
Dual operations: Hamas has employed dual military action through the intense fire bombardment of more than five thousand rockets in one go to multiple areas under occupation, including Jerusalem. This was the first wave of operation Tufan Al Aqsa, that prepared the ground for the second wave that included the entry of armed elements into occupied territories for direct combat in Israel. These armed elements did not only engage with occupation forces, but also to remained as long as possible. This may have been to send the message that these settlements are no longer safe for Israelis, which would be am atter of concern in any negotiations that could be held after the end of the current escalation.
High intelligence capabilities of resistance movements: As far as resistance movements go, Operation Tufan al-Aqsa showed significant intelligence advances. Hamas successfully launched the attack through three land, sea and air hubs, entering the occupied areas. An operation of such magnitude certainly needed a long time to prepare, equip, train, and introduce new advanced weapons as well as coordinate with other parties such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah. All of which point to Hamas’ strong intelligence capabilities, and its preparedness to conceal the nature and scale of the attack, and resist Israel’s counter.
Shocking and confusing Israel’s security and intelligence services: Operation Tufan Al Aqsa shocked and confused Israeli forces and government, as well as its Western allies. Some have observed that Tufan Al Aqsa bore similar features to the October 1973 war. The Israeli death toll has surpassed 700 dead, 2200 injured and more than 100 prisoners, other than hundreds missing. It also involved the destruction of battalions and military equipment, the retention of resistance elements and the continued presence of resistance elements in occupied territories for a second day.
Maximizing human and material losses in Israel: The Hamas movement’s objective in Operation Tufan al-Aqsa was to maximize Israeli human, material, and military casualties, impair infrastructure in the settlements, and take hostages. The purpose of this incursion is to gain leverage in negotiations to demand the easing of the blockade, the release of Palestinian prisoners, or the cessation of assassinations. That is why more than 700 Israelis were killed, over 2,000 were injured, dozens captured, entire battalions and military equipment destroyed, security and police headquarters burned down. Given the expected swift and brutal Israeli response, Hamas aimed to create the greatest casualties in its strike to pressure Israel’s political leadership and interior defense.
Plans to counter Israel’s response: The scope and scale of Operation Tufan al-Aqsa clearly confirms offensive and defensive measures, with Hamas making plans to counter Israel’s response. Hamas has pursued a strategy to extend the battle to West Bank areas, inviting Palestinian National Authority (PNA) members to participate, not only in demonstrations and strikes but with weapons, resistance, and martyrdom.
The scope of Hamas’s operation does not end in Palestine, but extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah launched several strikes targeting three Israeli military positions in the occupied Shab ‘a farms. Hezbollah fired drones into the occupied farms, and shot down Israeli drones. This prompted Israel to retaliate and prompted international warnings against Lebanon’s involvement in the escalation. Hamas has also forced other resistance movements to join because of popular support; indeed, despite their differences, the Jihad movement joined Hamas even though it was left out of the initial Hamas strike.
The use of new military techniques: Hamas used new military techniques in confrontations with Israel, such as high-altitude military parachuting, military diving, drones, and the powerful anti-warplanes and helicopters, marking a major shift in the militarization of Hamas. After thorough technical preparations, the strike seamlessly integrated these new techniques. Former CIA officer Mick Mulroy, emphasized that the Hamas attack was complex, and needed a lot of time in preparation. It was preceded by a cyberattack, which confirmed the movement’s possession of advanced electronic warfare techniques.
Pursuing open warfare and abandoning the logic of limited strikes: Operation Tufan Al-Aqsa demonstrates Hamas’s abandonment of the logic of limited strikes, and a shift towards open warfare on all fronts simultaneously. Where it has previously conducted temporary spatial strikes at simple targets, it is now heading towards prolonged open war scenarios. This means that it is confident in its equipment, military reserves, and support from abroad. Such a war requires long-lasting military capabilities and ammunition supplies to inflict the ongoing casualties that will force Israel to make concessions in occupied areas. Indeed, the Israeli Security cabinet has announced war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in response to the 7 October strike.
Interest in media promotion and show of force: Hamas documented the attack with advanced technical capabilities through cameras mounted on drones and rifles, together with the video release of incursions, captive officers and the destruction of military equipment. They also videoed and displayed their military force on the streets of Gaza in the early hours of the attack, an important transformation aimed to baost Hamas’ strength to increase its popularity and regain its political and military weight internally and externally. It also embarrassed Israeli leadership, and pressured it to make further concessions and prompt it to acknowledge the losses suffered.
Escalation scenarios
There are several scenarios for the escalation between Israel and the resistance movements:
Increased escalation and an open war: the situation between Israel and the Palestinian resistance movements is expected to escalate into open war. Israel officially declared a state of war for the first time since the October 1973. Conversely, Palestinian resistance movements have come together, including Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, declaring that they had captured 30 Israelis, in addition to participating in incursions and killings of Israeli soldiers. Joining the resistance are other regional parties such as Lebanese Hezbollah, who could possibly support resistance operations in other countries targeting Israeli interests and persons, which drives an open war scenario that could span months.
The status quo and the continuing political and military stalemate: According to this scenario, the current wave of escalation ends at the level of response and counter-response, with a military resolution being unlikely. Although all indicators confirm Israel’s international military and political supremacy, Israel’s implementation of a comprehensive ground operation to invade the Gaza Strip after its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 is unlikely. It will not be able to engage in a ground confrontation with resistance movements. Nor will it be able to fight an open-ended war in either the West Bank or southern Lebanon, with the prospect of inimical Iranian support as well as other regional players.
Also, regional and international pressure (Russia, China) and the rejection of Israel’s escalation against the Gaza Strip in its entirety could force Israel to concentrate its objectives against resistance movements to maximize their military capabilities. The Iron Swords launched by Israel in response to Tufan Al Aqsa will set Hamas back 50 years. This will set the tone for the status quo, a political stalemate with some limited operations by the parties, and a greater dependence on regional and international developments.
The potential for compromise: It is anticipated that the situation after Operation Tufan Al Aqsa will not be the same as before. It has brought about radical military, political and security changes in which resistance movements have demonstrated their new strength, allowing them to achieve several political and security gains in the coming period. Israel may also have to temporarily calm down and bow to some demands, because international developments are not in its favor given the West’s preoccupation with the Russian war against Ukraine, as well as the turmoil at home due to the presidential election despite Biden’s announcement to send massive military aid to Israel.
Hamas is also aware that it will not be able to stay in occupied settlements, nor hold 100 hostages (according to the Israeli government), so it will reap the greatest gains after inflicting maximum losses on Israel that Tel Aviv has seen since the October 1973 war.
A new phase
In conclusion, it could be said that the parties’ ability to achieve consensus through compromise, especially Israel, will determine the near future. Although any truce would be temporary at best, it would still be the beginning of new dynamics when compared to the time before October 2023, not only as a result of the changes it has brought about within Israel or in Palestine and the work of resistance movements, but regionally and internationally. States in the region are not prepared for radical shifts, particularly when it comes to military conflict in Palestinian. Hamas will not be able to continue an open war under the blockade given the difficulty of obtaining weapons and ammunition. Israel also suffers from a sharp internal division that will lead it to rearrange security, military and political conditions. And this explains its desire not to escalate on the Lebanese front and strike Hezbollah. Even for Hamas, the number of losses among Palestinians (413 dead and 2300 injured on the first day, reaching 700 dead, 2200 and more than 100 prisoners on the second day of operations is a precedent that never happened before.
